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A puzzling piece of empirical evidence suggests that countries rich in natural resources 
tend to have dismal economic performance. This paradigm has come to be known as the 
“resource curse”. This paper deals with the role of institutional quality in explaining the 
transmission mechanism of the resource curse. I attempt to explain this phenomenon by 
using the index of economic freedom developed by the Fraser Institute as a proxy for the 
quality of institutions. The outcomes of the linear and non-linear interactions between 
resource  abundance  and  institutional  quality  turn  out  to  be  the  key  elements  that 
determine the intensity, if existent, or otherwise of the resource curse. Rather than look at 
cross country data like many others, I focus on the 10 provinces and 50 states in Canada 
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1. Introduction 
 
Most empirical studies of the “resource curse” do not explain in details the transmission 
mechanism  through  which  natural  resources  impact  the  development  process.  The 
resource curse is a term in the economic literature that refers to the paradox that countries 
endowed with natural resources tend to have dismal economic performance. Sachs and 
Warner (1995) estimate that an increase of one standard deviation in natural resource 
intensity (on average 16% of GNP) leads to a reduction of about 1 percent per year in 
economic growth. This phenomenon has been coined the resource curse hypothesis. The 
fact that economies with little or no resources often do much better in terms of economic 
growth  than  resource-intensive  economies  remains  a  puzzle  in  resource  economics, 
thereby paving the way for a critical examination of the transmission mechanism through 
which natural resources impact economic growth. The purpose of this paper is to examine 
whether the quality of institutions has a distinct role in the analysis of the resource curse. 
 
Several examples abound in explaining how resource-poor jurisdictions often outperform 
resource-rich ones in economic growth. This, however, is not a generalization as there are 
many resource-abundant countries with very high economic growth rates. For instance, 
economic history reveals that resource-poor Netherlands did much better than Spain in 
economic growth despite the presence of gold and silver in the Americas where Spain 
had much of its empire in the seventeenth century (Sachs and Warner, 1997). Switzerland 
is one of the richest countries in the world today, and it is a good example of a country 
that  depended  on  the  financial  and  manufacturing  sectors,  and  not  natural  resource 
extraction in the quest for economic development. The highly developed economies of 
the four Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) maintained 
exceptionally high growth rates and rapid industrialization between the early 1960s and 
1990s which led to their transformation into advanced and high-income economies in the 
21st century. The experience of all four Asian Tigers shows that they specialized where 
they had a competitive advantage. For example, Hong Kong and Singapore became world 
leading  international  financial  centres,  while South  Korea  and  Taiwan  became  world 
leaders  in  information  technology.  This  contrasts  sharply  with  the  situation  in  many 
resource-abundant economies such as Nigeria, Mexico and Venezuela where there is low 
standard  of  living,  corruption,  income  inequality  and  civil  disturbances  –  anecdotal 
evidence that natural resources may have a negative influence on economic development. 
 
In  economics,  productive  inputs  are  the  resources  employed  to  produce  goods  and 
services.  They  facilitate  production  but  do  not  become  part  of  the  product  or  are 
significantly transformed by the production process. Likewise, economic theory suggests 
that increasing a country’s stock of assets provides greater opportunities for economic 
prosperity  and  should  translate  into  more  production  (Sullivan  and  Sheffrin,  2003). 
Economic history shows further that the development process of many of the highly 
industrialized  countries  of  today  follows  the  conventional  economic  reasoning  in  the 
preceding  statement.  For  example,  Britain  and  the  United  States  both  had  abundant 
natural resources, either through colonies or through natural expansion, which provided 
the basis for strong economic growth and rising standards of living. Also, the prosperous 
agricultural,  forest  and  mineral  industries  of  many  of  the  Scandinavian  countriescontributed  immensely  to  sustained  growth  and large  increases  in  living  standards in 
these jurisdictions (WESS, 2006). These are good examples of how natural resources can 
be a blessing and not a curse in the development process.   
 
The complex and diverse experiences of the various countries mentioned above reveal 
that the various links in the resource curse are not deterministic as suggested by most of 
the available models on resource endowments and economic performance. For instance, 
Botswana is one out of many developed and developing countries (e.g. Australia, Canada, 
Norway and Malaysia) that typify notable exceptions to the resource curse hypothesis. 
Since independence in 1996, Botswana has had one of the fastest growth rates in per 
capita income in the world through heavy reliance on the mining sector. This has led to 
the  transformation  of  Botswana  from  one  of  the  poorest  countries  in  the  world  to  a 
middle-income country. This example clearly explains why it is hazardous to jump to the 
conclusion that all resource abundant countries  are cursed, and suggests the need for 
giving a satisfactory explanation as to why resource abundance retards growth in some 
countries  and  promotes  development  in  others  (Mehlum  et  al.  2006,  Robinson  et  al. 
2006). 
 
The fundamental question posed by the resource curse is whether it is a curse to be rich in 
natural resources. If the answer to this is yes in some jurisdictions, then, the question to 
which I turn is whether the curse can be avoided by good institutions, which can be 
measured  by  a  good  indicator.  I  intend  to  answer  these  questions  in  this  paper  by 
developing a framework that further explores the efforts of previous researchers on the 
problems  with  resource-intensive  economies  by  using  the  Economic  Freedom  Index 
(EFI)  developed  by  the  Fraser  Institute  (Karabegovic  et  al,  2008)  as  a  proxy  for 
institutional quality.  
 
An interesting aspect of this study is that apart from looking at the interaction between 
resource  abundance  and  institutional  quality  as  a  way  of  better  understanding  the 
transmission  mechanism  of  the  resource  curse,  the  analysis  focuses  on  Canadian 
provinces and US states. The provinces and the states share a great deal of common 
institutional framework. This is especially so for the 10 provinces within Canada and the 
50 states within the United States, but it also is true that the US and Canada are also fairly 
similar in institutional quality – at least compared to other developing and developed 
countries. Consequently, variation in institutional quality across these regions is going to 
be subtle relative to cross country comparisons. In this regard, we have a potentially 
strong  test  of  the role  of  institutional  quality  in  the  effect  of  resources  on  economic 
performance. 
  
To achieve the above objectives, this paper will be presented in 5 sections. I review some 
extant literature in section 2, followed by a discussion of the possible explanations for the 
existence of the resource curse and the role of institutional quality. In section 3, I present 
the theoretical framework using the Mankiw-Romer-Weil (MRW) model which forms 
the basis of my estimation. Section 4 discusses the data, descriptive statistics, and then 
presents  the  estimation  results  for  all  the  jurisdictions,  Canadian  provinces  only,  US 
states only, followed by implications of the results. The fixed effects estimator is used in   2 
addition to the ordinary least square estimator in order to allow for within-jurisdiction 
variations which take care of the variations among the observations in the sample data in 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Rents from natural resources constitute an important source of development finance if a 
country’s resource policy, fiscal policy, institutions and the structure of governance are 
properly harnessed. Recent estimates compiled by the World Bank (2006) show that the 
natural  capital  share  (26  percent)  of  total  wealth  is  much  greater  than  the  share  of 
produced capital (16 percent) in low-income countries. In developing countries where 
natural resources play a major role in the composition of wealth, the importance of good 
governance  in  transforming  such  natural  resource  endowments  into  good  economic 
performance can not be over-emphasized (Hamilton and Giovanni, 2006). In a similar 
study on substitution between types of assets, Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) establish 
that rather than see the rents from natural resources as a source of finance for major 
public initiatives and recurrent expenditures, countries that succeeded in escaping the 
resource curse channeled such rents towards productive investments. From the foregoing, 
the  importance  of  natural  resources  in  breaking  the  vicious  circle  of  poverty  for 
sustainable economic growth is apparent, especially in poor countries. Also apparent is 
the potential role for high quality institutions to develop and manage natural resources. 
 
The popular view that countries rich in natural resources, on average, tend to grow more 
slowly than countries without such resources is termed the ‘resource curse’. There exist 
several  explanations  for  the  resource  curse  —  the  most  notable  one  being  that  the 
exploitation of natural resources triggers the so-called Dutch disease, a situation in which 
increase  in  revenues  from  natural  resources  de-industrializes  a  nation’s  economy  by 
raising the exchange rate, thereby making the manufacturing sector less competitive. The 
resource  curse  is  a  regularity  documented  by  a  number  of  studies  in  the  empirical 
literature, starting with the famous work of Sachs and Warner (1995) which formally 
established the resource curse. Using the ratio of natural resource exports to GDP as a 
proxy for natural resource endowment, and 1971 as the base year, they control for other 
determinants  of  economic  growth  such  as  initial  per  capita  income,  trade  policy, 
government  efficiency,  and  investment  rates.  Their  results,  which  support  a  dynamic 
version of the Dutch disease model, show that on average, resource-abundant countries 
lag behind countries with less resources. This has become the most commonly cited work 
in the resource curse literature. 
 
A number of authors have further developed the work of Sachs and Warner, and they all 
argue in one way or the other that the resource curse is not as simple as they depict. 
While some are of the opinion that the resource curse is conditional on the political and 
economic environment; e.g. Mehlum et al (2006), Robinson et al (2006) and Bulte and 
Damania (2008), others maintain that resource abundance generates weak institutions e.g. 
Collier and Hoffler (2002). Some theoretical and empirical evidence for these divergent 
views are reviewed below. 
 
Robinson  et  al  (2006)  present  a formal  political-economy  framework  of  the  resource 
curse  by  arguing  that  in  order  to  understand  whether  or  not  natural  resources  are  a 
blessing  or  a  curse,  it  is  imperative  to  analyze  the  political  incentives  that  resource 
endowments generate – through a careful analysis of the interaction between institutions   4 
and resources. In order to fully analyze the effects of temporary and permanent resource 
booms,  they  use  a  two-period  probabilistic  model  to  consider  some  stock  of  natural 
resources with an intertemporal path of prices subject to exogenous price variation – 
capturing the environment faced by small developing economies subject to international 
commodity  price  variations.  Their  analysis  reveals  a  complex  relationship  between 
resource  extraction  and  the  political  environment.  Where  there  are  weak  political 
institutions,  resource  booms  will  lead,  through  the  political  process,  to  inefficient 
resource  allocations.  They  conclude  that  the  extent  to  which  the  predictions  in  their 
model generate the curse is determined by the quality of institutions since countries with 
strong  institutions  benefit  from  resource  booms,  while  those  without  suffer  from  the 
curse. 
 
Bulte  and  Damania  (2008)  explain  the  resource  curse  phenomenon  by  developing  a 
lobbying game model in which rent seeking firms interact with a corrupt government 
which acts strategically. Using the presence or absence of political competition to define 
incumbent governments’ degree of freedom in the pursuit of development policies that 
maximize surplus in the lobbying game mentioned above, the main prediction of their 
analysis is that the presence or absence of political competition and the potential costs of 
political transitions are the key elements that generate the resource curse – by unleashing 
rent seeking and growth-depleting policies that put the economy off its optimal path. 
They run growth regressions similar to Sachs and Warner’s and include an interaction 
term: [autocracy] x [resource abundance], to capture the transmission mechanism of the 
resource curse — with the ratio of primary goods exports to GDP serving as a proxy for 
resource abundance. They conclude that the interaction term captures the main effect of 
resource abundance on growth, and therefore suggest that it is reasonable to link resource 
booms to under-provision of semi-public goods (e.g. education), which adversely impacts 
productivity in the manufacturing sector through rent seeking and corruption. 
 
Collier and Hoffler (2002) show in their analysis that natural resources often generate 
civil  conflicts  in  many  developing  countries,  and  these  in  turn,  adversely  affect 
institutional quality due to the deleterious effects which economic inequality, political 
exclusion, political oppression and ethnic/religious hatred have on grievance – the major 
cause of rebellion. Using a data set of civil wars from 1960 to 1999, they show that 
primary  commodity  exports  increase  the  probability  of  civil  conflicts  because  they 
worsen governance, and generate stronger grievances – their estimated results show a 
strong and non–linear relationship between natural resources and conflict, with the risk of 
conflict at a maximum when the proportion of primary exports in GDP is 33%. 
 
In an attempt to improve on the influential work of Sachs and Warner, Mehlum et al 
(2006) contrast the findings of Sachs and Warner that institutions are not decisive for the 
resource curse by using the latter’s data and methodology to test their (Mehlum et al’s) 
hypothesis that institutions are actually decisive for the resource curse. Using the average 
growth rate of real GDP per capita from 1965 to 1990 as the dependent variable, and an 
unweighted average of five indexes which ranges from zero to unity (rule of law index, 
bureaucratic quality index, corruption in government index, risk of expropriation index 
and government repudiation of contract index) as a proxy for institutional quality, they   5 
demonstrate  that  countries  with  good  institutional  quality  will  not  experience  any 
resource  curse  as  natural  resources  only  inhibit  economic  growth  in  countries  with 
‘grabber friendly’ institutions and not in countries with ‘producer friendly’ institutions. 
 
Mehlum et al go beyond the regressions of Sachs and Warner by providing an alternative 
explanation  for  the  understanding  of  the  resource  curse  through  the  inclusion  of  an 
interaction term: [resource abundance] x [institutional quality], that captures their model 
prediction which states that it is only when institutions are weak that resource abundance 
is harmful to growth. In addition to finding a positive coefficient for the interaction term 
as stated in their apriori expectations, the empirical results equally show that countries 
with institutional quality index higher than the threshold value of 0.93 do not experience 
the resource curse. As such, 15 out of the 87 countries included in the regression have 
institutional quality strong enough to neutralize the resource curse – which is manifested 
through a negative growth impact of a marginal increase in resources. 
 
From the foregoing review, it is apparent that institutions matter in the analysis of the 
resource  curse  –  since  the  problem  has  come  to  be  identified  as  one  in  which  poor 
institutional  quality  interacts  with  other  variables  to  generate  social  and  economic 
outcomes which are not Pareto optimal. This paper fits into the various discussions so far 
because it is an extension of the study by Mehlum et al, albeit, the analysis here is at a 
state and provincial level. This is interesting because previous studies on the resource 
curse have been largely done at the cross-country level, notably because necessary data 
and  information  on  resource  issues  often  times  fall  under  the  portfolio  of  national 
jurisdictions. By looking at regions (in Canada and the United States) that share many 
common laws and institutions, I empirically investigate the role of institutions in the 
resource curse paradigm after controlling for a lot of country-specific features that might 
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3.0 Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1 The Mankiw-Romer-Weil (MRW) Model 
 
The Solow growth model presents a theoretical framework for understanding the sources 
of  economic  growth,  and  the  consequences  for  long-run  growth  of  changes  in  the 
economic environment. The pattern and speed of regional income and convergence has 
been a central issue in the growth literature for sometime. A framework available to 
directly test the Solow growth model is the growth empirics method of Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil (1992) where they argue that the Cobb-Douglas formulation of Solow’s growth 
model should be extended to include human capital as well as physical capital. This 







1-α-β ……………………..…………………………………………………… (1) 
 
Where Y is total income, L is labour supply and A is a technology parameter, with L 
growing at an annual rate n and A growing at rate g. 
 
In line with Solow, MRW rewrite income, physical and human capita in (1) in terms of 
quantities per unit of effective labour, yt = Yt /AtLt, kt = Kt /AtLt and ht=Ht /AtLt. The 
changes over time in physical and human capital per unit effective labour are: 
 
k’t = skyt – (n+ g+ δ) kt……………………...………….…………………..…………………… (2) 
 
h’t = shyt – (n+ g+ δ) ht ………………………………….……………………………………… (3) 
 
where δ is the proportionate depreciation for both physical and human capital, and sk and 
sh are the respective savings rates for physical and human capital which are assumed to 
be constant over time, though not across countries. Solving for steady-state solutions k* 
and h*, MRW derive an equation for steady-state income growth as follows: 
 
lnYt = lnA0 + gt – ((α + β)/ (1– α – β)) ln (n + g + d) + (α / (1– α – β)) lnsk + (β/ (1– α – β)) lnsh………. (4) 
 
The physical capital savings rate, sk, was approximated by the investment share in GDP, 
while the human capital savings rate sh was measured by the proportion of the working 
age  population  at  any  one  time  enrolled  in  secondary  school.  MRW  conclude  that 
augmenting the Solow model with measures of human capital leads to an improvement in 
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3.2 Model Specification 
 
In  this  paper,  the  objective  is  to  assess  the  role  of  resource  sectors  and  institutional 
quality on production using the MRW model as a general framework. Data limitations, 
especially  US  investment  data  and  education  data,  preclude  fully  employing  such  a 
structural model. As an alternative, education share of total production is used in place of 
the percentage of working age population that is enrolled in secondary school used by 
MRW. Even  though  the  model  can  not  be  estimated  fully,  I  nonetheless  use  it  as  a 
framework as best as I can. This is outlined in the next subsection. 
 
With the MRW framework as a guide, the analysis proceeds as follows. First, I present a 
simple  summary  of  the  possible  linkages  between  output  and  resources  using  simple 
scatter  plots.  Second,  I  look  more  formally  at  the  relationship  using  standard  OLS 
regression methods for panel data. An important feature of the regression analysis is that 




The robustness of the baseline specification is tested using two estimators – the ordinary 
least squares pooled estimator and the panel least squares fixed-effects estimator. Using 
the Chi square test, the null hypothesis which states that unobserved heterogeneity does 
not exist is either accepted or rejected. As well, other hypotheses which consider the 
interaction  effect  between  resources  and  institutions,  as  well  as  the  individual  and 
combined effect of these variables on the level of real GDP per capita in the selected 
jurisdictions are considered. 
 
3.2.1 The Model  
 
The basic econometric  specification for testing the proposed effects of resources  and 
institutional quality on the level of real GDP per capita in each jurisdiction is given as: 
 
lnRGDPit = β0 + β1ln (MINit) + β2ln (EFIit) + β3ln (EFIit)
2 + β4ln (EDUit) + β5ln (HLTit) + µit…. (5) 
 
The variables of the model are defined in the table below and µit is a random error term. 
 
RGDPit   Real GDP Per Capita levels for jurisdiction i at time t 
MINit   Mining Share of Production (resource abundance) for jurisdiction i at time t 
EFIit   Economic Freedom Index (institutional quality) for jurisdiction i at time t 
EDUit   Educational Services Share of Production (control) for jurisdiction i at time t 
HLIit  Healthcare Share of Production (control) for jurisdiction i at time t 
CDMit  Country Dummy for jurisdiction i at time t 
TDMit   Time Dummy for jurisdiction i at time t 
 
Equation (5) clearly departs considerably form the MRW model. It does so because of 
limited availability of data. Specifically, we do not have investment share data for the US 
states.  What  it  does  capture  is  the  dependence  of  per  capita  output  on  the  relative 
importance  of  the  mining  sector  in  overall  production,  which  is  our  key  means  of 
identifying the contribution of the resource sector to overall production. Also included as   8 
controls, in part motivated by the MRW model, are measures of health and education 
services in total production. 
 
As noted, a key focus of the paper is to determine to what extent institutional quality, 
measured by the EFI index, influences the role of resource dependence. We introduce the 
direct effects of institutional quality on output per capita in a quadratic fashion, which 
allows for greater flexibility in modeling the possible direct relationship. 
 
We also introduce two dummy variables (CDMit & TDMit) are included to capture the 
effects of country and time differences. These are Country Dummy, CDMit (Canadian 
provinces = 1, US states = 0) and Time Dummy, TDMit (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 for the years 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively). In effect, we are assuming that 
 
β0 = δ0 + δ1 CDMit + δ2 TDMit …………………………..…………………………………………(6) 
 
Substituting for β0 in the basic model (equation 5) above, we obtain the unrestricted 
model that captures the effects of country and time differences as follows: 
 
lnRGDPit = δ0 + δ1 CDMit + δ2 TDMit + β1ln(MINit)+ β2ln (EFIit) + β3ln(EFIit)
2 + β4ln(EDUit) + 
β5ln(HLTit)+ µit…………………………………………………………………………………...(7) 
 
With  the  above  model,  for  two  jurisdictions  with  identical  resource  endowment  and 
institutional quality, except that one is a Canadian province (with CDM = 1) and the other 
a US state (with CDM = 0), we would expect on the average, a difference of δ1 percent in 
their respective output levels. These issues are discussed further in the next section. 
 
We now introduce the possibility that the output effect of resource abundance β1, depends 
upon institutional quality, possibly in a non-linear manner:  
 
β1   = β0 + β2ln (EFIit) + β3ln(EFIit)
2  ……………………………...…………………………..…. (8) 
 
Substituting equation (8) into (7) and we get the following relationship: 
 




2 + β5ln(EDUit) + β6ln(HLTit)+ µit…………………………………………….……(9) 
 
The motivation for equation (8) above comes from the reviewed literature in section 2 
(especially Mehlum et al) where the main prediction agrees with the empirical findings 
which establish that resource abundance is harmful to growth only when the quality of 
institutions is weak. In equation (9) above, ln(MINit)xln(EFIit) and ln(MINit)xln(EFIit)
2 
are the two interaction terms that capture the fact that institutional quality is the medium 
through which the resource curse may be transmitted.  
 
From  equation  (9)  above,  the  impact  of  a  marginal  change  in  resource  abundance 
(lnMINit) on the level of real per capita income (lnRGDPit) is given below as:   
   9 
d(lnRGDPit) =  β0 + β1(lnEFIit) + β2(lnEFIit)
2 ………………………..………………………....(10)  
d(lnMINit) 
 
If institutional quality plays no role in the resource effect, then the two slope coefficients 
will be zero. Otherwise, resource dependence will depend upon the level of institutional 
quality.  Figure  1  represents  the  relationship  in  (10).  Here  we  have  represented  the 
relationship so that there is some level of EFI such that beyond this, resource abundance 
is a positive contribution to output per capita while below this point resource abundance 
is  indeed  a  curse.  We  have  also  postulated  that  there  are  diminishing  returns  to 
instititutional quality: the incremental gain in output falls for higher levels of EFI. It is of 
course quite possible that the estimated coefficients might locate the curve entirely below 
zero – a pervasive resource curse – or entirely above zero. Moreover, we may observe 
constant  or  increasing  returns  to  EFI.  In  the  empirical  section  below,  we  report  the 
resource effect in equation (10) evaluated at the mean levels of EFI; we also report an 
estimate of the function in (10) for all EFI. 
 
We are also interested in the overall impact of a marginal change in institutional quality 
on the level of real output per capita. This is given as: 
 
d(lnRGDPit) =  β3 + 2*β4ln(EFIit)  +   β1(lnMINit) + 2*β2 (lnMINit)(lnEFIit)………………......(11) 
d(lnEFIit) 
 
In this case, the effect of institutional quality depends not only on the resource sector, but 
also  on  the  outcome  of  the  interaction  between  the  resource  sector  (lnMINit)  and 
institutional quality (lnEFIit). This fact is adequately captured by the last term on the right 
hand side of equation (11). In the empirical analysis below, we calculate this effect at the 
mean levels of EFI and MIN. 
 
On final comment is in order. Unlike Mehlum et al (2006), this study focuses on levels of 
income per capita rather than growth rates. Our reasoning is as follows. First, it is levels, 
rather than growth rates that capture fundamental cross-country differences in in welfare 
levels. Second, the MRW framework (that is, the Solow model) that we follow has two 
relationships, one in levels, the other in growth rates. The former is only appropriate for 
countries in steady state, which is arguably reasonable for the jurisdictions in Canada and 
the United States; less so, though, for  cross country studies such as Mehlum et al (2006). 
Of course, the growth rate relationships are also valid for steady state but as noted the 
level of output per capita is a more interesting measure than the output growth rate. 
Finally,  there  is  a  very  short  time frame  for  the  data,  limited  by the  EFI,  for  which 
analysis of growth rates is probably not suited. 
   10 
 
Figure 1   11 




The data used in this study are compiled from four main sources: United States Bureau of 
Economic  Analysis  (Regional  Economic  Accounts),  Statistics  Canada  (National 
Economic Accounts – CANSIM II), The Fraser Institute Report (Economic Freedom of 
North America, 2008 Annual Report), and Bank of Canada (Rates and Statistics – Annual 
Average Exchange Rates). The measure of total output from 2000-2005 for all the 60 
jurisdictions (50 US states and 10 Canadian provinces) is Real GDP Per Capita (chained 
2000  US  dollars).  Data  for  the  US  are  obtained  from  the  United  States  Bureau  of 
Economic Analysis (Regional Economic Accounts). The initial Real GDP (chained 2002 
Cdn dollars) data for Canadian provinces are obtained from Statistics Canada (National 
Economic Accounts – CANSIM II), and then standardized by adjusting with the annual 
population data, chained 2000 GDP deflator and average annual US-Cdn exchange rate 
for 2000. In all, there are 360 observations obtained from pooled cross section of 60 
jurisdictions from 2000-2005. 
 
The  main  measure  of  resource  abundance  in  this  study  is  Mining  Share  of  Total 
Production (MIN), while the two control variables are Educational Services Share of 
Total Production (EDU) and Healthcare and Social Assistance Share of Total Production 
(HLT). Data for these three variables from 2000-2005 are obtained from the Regional 
Economic Accounts of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis for the 50 US states, and 
CANSIM II under the National Economic Accounts section of Statistics Canada for the 
10 Canadian provinces. Institutional quality is measured by the Economic Freedom Index 
constructed by the Fraser Institute. Due to the important role which institutional quality 
plays in understanding the transmission mechanism of the resource curse, I take a closer 
look at the EFI as a measure of institutional quality in section 4.2 below. 
 
4.2 EFI as a Measure of Institutional Quality 
 
The term “institutional quality” refers to an institutional environment that is supportive of 
markets  through  property  rights  protection,  enforcement  of  contracts,  and  voluntary 
exchange at market-determined prices – thereby supporting the institutional approach to 
growth  which  is  based  on  the  notion  that  both  the  availability  and  productivity  of 
resources are influenced by the institutional and policy environment (Gwartney et al, 
2004). A number of studies have linked levels of economic freedom with higher levels of 
economic growth and income. For example, Easton and Walker (1997) find that changes 
in economic freedom have a significant impact on the steady-state level of income even 
after the level of technology, the level of education of the workforce, and the level of 
investment are taken into account – leading to the conclusion that economic freedom is a 
separate determinant of the level of income. Equally, Hall and Jones (1999) conclude that 
a quality infrastructure is present  when the institutions and government policies of a 
country encourage productive behaviour (e.g., accumulation of skills or the development   12 
of new goods and production techniques) and discourage predatory activities (e.g., rent 
seeking, corruption, and theft.) 
 
To effectively capture the roles that institutions play in the resource curse hypothesis, I 
use the Economic Freedom of North America Index (EFI) constructed by Karabegovic et 
al (2008) as a measure of institutional quality in this paper. The EFI measures economic 
freedom  on  a  10-point  scale  and  provides  measures  for  US  states  and  Canadian 
provinces. A high degree of economic freedom is indicated by the highest possible score 
of 10. The index weights a variety variables such as the size of government, taxation, 
labour  market  programmes,  and  other  indicators  that  are  assumed  to  contribute  to 
economic freedom and the free operation of markets. 
 
One major advantage of using the EFI as a measure of institutional quality in this study is 
that  it  encompasses  many  factors  that  economists  generally  agree  would  facilitate 
economic activities and enhance growth. Table 1 and Figure 2 below show the summary 
statistics for EFI values for the 60 jurisdictions between 2000 and 2005.  
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of EFI from 2000-2005 
 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2000-05 
 Mean  6.29  6.29  6.33  6.46  6.55  6.59  6.42 
 Median  6.45  6.50  6.55  6.65  6.70  6.75  6.60 
 Maximum  8.10  8.20  8.30  8.40  8.40  8.50  8.50 
 Minimum  3.90  3.80  4.00  3.90  3.90  3.80  3.80 
 Std. Dev.  0.88  0.89  0.89  0.92  0.91  0.92  0.90 
 Obs  60  60  60  60  60  60  360 
   13 
Economic Freedom Index 
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 Figure 2 
 
 
4.3 The Resource Curse − A Quick Look 
 
In this section, I take a quick look at the data with respect to discussions so far on the 
resource curse. To achieve this, the level of real GDP per capita between 2000 and 2005 
for  60  jurisdictions  is  plotted  against  natural  resource  abundance  (measured  by  the 
Mining  Share  of  Total  Production).  As  depicted  by  Figure  3  below,  there  is  some 
preliminary evidence of the resource curse. 
 
In Figure 4, Real GDP Per Capita is plotted against the quality of institutions, which is 
measured  by  the  Economic  Freedom  Index  discussed  earlier.  There  is  a  positive 
correlation between income level and the quality of institutions with an R
2 value of 0.68. 
This correlation suggests that if appropriate institutions are in place, the market system 
provides an incentive for economic growth by affecting the rate of investment as well as 
through the productivity of resource use.  
 
While  the  high  correlation  is  consistent  with  our  priors  as  well  as  a  large  literature 
relating institutional quality to economic performance; e.g. Easton and Walker (1997) 
and  Hall  and  Jones  (1999),  one  has  to  be  careful  interpreting  this  as  a  causal.  It  is 
perfectly plausible that the causation runs in the opposite direction: a higher level of 
development permits greater economic freedom. Moreover, the construction of the index 
itself may be a source of problem. Suppose that in the process of constructing the EFI, 
measures that are associated with growth are considered while those that are not are   14 
discarded  implicitly  or  explicitly.  Then  the  correlation  reflects  a  reverse  causality 
inherent in the index construction. These concerns of reverse causality are difficult to 
address in our empirical work and qualify our results, both the simple correlations in 
these scatterplot figures and in the regression analysis that follows. Unfortunately, a more 
thorough treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of the paper. 
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4.4 Institutional Dichotomy and the Resource Curse 
 
A pertinent question to ask at this juncture is whether or not good institutions can prevent 
the curse. Mehlum et al (2006) plot the average yearly economic growth from 1965 to 
1990 against resource abundance in countries that have more than 10% of their GDP as 
resource exports. In order to account for the quality of institutions, they split the sample 
further into two subsamples of equal size — with one sample consisting of countries with 
good institutions and the other, countries with bad institutions. Similarly, I split the EFI 
sample  into  two  on  the  basis  of  the  median  value  of  6.75  for  EFI  in  2005.  Thus, 
jurisdictions  with  median  values  above  6.75  are  categorized  as  having  superior 
institutions while those with values below are said to have inferior institutions. Figure 5 
shows the outcome of this dichotomy.  
1 
Again, the resource curse is established for jurisdictions with both superior and inferior 
institutions as measured by the median value of their EFIs in 2005. However, a careful 
look at the scatter plot shows that the relationship, as measured by the slope, does not 
appear to depend upon separation into low and high EFI categories. This may not be 
unconnected with the overall effects of omitted variables in the model. It may also reflect 
the relatively crude separation technique adopted for EFI above. Regression analysis will 
hopefully help resolve this ambiguity. 
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4.5 Estimation Results 
 
In  this  section,  four  tables  are  presented  to  summarize  the  estimation  results  for  the 
model. Tables 4–6 show the estimation results for our baseline specification using both 
ordinary least squares (pooled estimator) and the fixed effects estimator; Table 7 presents 
the output effects of institutional quality and resource abundance at their respective mean 
values for the regression models. Each table shows  the results of using a fixed-effects 
estimator in order to check the robustness of the model. I use the fixed effects estimator in 
addition  to  the  pooled  estimator  because  the  former  allows  for  variation  among  the 
observations in the sample data in response to jurisdiction-specific fixed effects and, as a 
result, it takes into account within-jurisdiction variations. I leave out the time-invariant 
country dummies (CDM) that appear in each equation when estimating the fixed effects 
equations since the fixed effects fully account for jurisdictional differences. 
 
For the full sample of jurisdictions, we estimate the model by OLS both with CDM and 
without CDM. The latter is reported because it is directly comparable to the fixed effect 
estimates reported. To determine the appropriateness of the fixed effects model for the   17 
specified  model,  a  chi-square  test  for  the  presence  of  unobserved  heterogeneity  is 
reported. 
 
The  descriptive  statistics  and  correlation  matrix  for  all  the  variables  included  in  the 
estimated model for all jurisdictions from 2000-2005 are provided in Tables 2 and 3 
below. A cursory look at the correlation matrix for the entire sample in Table 3 reveals 
that a potential problem may arise because correlation coefficients of 0.976, 0.926, 0.998 
and  0.986  between  lnMIN  and  lnMINXlnEFI,  lnMIN  and  lnMINxlnEFI
2,  lnEFI  and 
lnEFI
2, and 
 lnMINxlnEFI and lnMINxlnEFI
2 respectively are very high, which points to 
the potential problem of multi-colinearity. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for model variables 
 
  lnRGDP  CDM  TDM  lnMIN  lnEFI  lnEDU  lnHLT 
Mean  10.35  0.17  3.50  -5.04  1.85  -4.62  -2.67 
Median  10.39  0.00  3.50  -5.29  1.89  -4.88  -2.66 
Maximum  10.98  1.00  6.00  -0.97  2.14  -2.68  -2.24 
Minimum  9.71  0.00  1.00  -9.39  1.34  -6.36  -3.27 
Std. Dev.  0.23  0.37  1.71  1.92  0.15  0.89  0.20 
Obs.  360  360  360  360  360  360  360 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix for key model variables 
 






2  lnEDU  lnHLT 
lnRGDP  1               
lnMIN  -0.373  1             
lnEFI  0.822  -0.204  1           
lnEFI
2  0.820  -0.211  0.998  1         
lnMINxlnEFI  -0.521  0.976  -0.393  -0.399  1       
lnMINxlnEFI
2  -0.616  0.926  -0.525  -0.530  0.986  1     
lnEDU  -0.496  -0.003  -0.604  -0.589  0.113  0.194  1   
lnHLT  -0.379  -0.272  -0.469  -0.476  -0.168  -0.079  0.316  1 
 
The results for the general model using all jurisdictions are presented in Table 4. As 
noted, both OLS and fixed effects estimators are reported. Reported standard errors are 
robust  to  cross-section  heteroscedasticity.  For  both  the  OLS  and  fixed  effect  (FE) 
estimator,  all  variables  are  statistically  significant  for  two-sided  tests  at  standard 
significance levels. Both the OLS and FE model fit the data well as measured by the 
adjusted R-squared statistic. 
 
Table  4  reveals  that  the  two  dummies,  CDM  and  TDM,  included  in  the  unrestricted 
version of the model estimated with OLS come out with highly significant coefficients 
for a two-sided test. The country dummy (CDM) coefficient comes out with a negative 
sign, which reflects the fact that the US jurisdictions are coded with value CDM = 0, and 
the  these  jurisdictions  typically  have  higher  levels  of  real  GDP  per  capita  than  their   18 
Canadian equivalents. The time dummy TDM has a positive sign and captures individual 
jurisdictions deterministic growth paths. 
 
The two control variables in the model, education (lnEDU) and health (lnHLT), are also 
statistically significant as shown by their p-values. However, the coefficients in some 
instances are negative. This is always true for the healthcare variable and true for the 
education  variable  in  one  of  the  models.  Clearly,  these  variables  are  not  serving  as 
controls in the manner we expect. This is a qualification of our results and merits further 
investigation. 
 
For both models, all of the terms involving lnMIN and lnEFI are statistically significant, 
which means that the resource effect and the institutional quality effect are both measured 
as functions of the underlying data rather than simple elasticities. This is consistent with 
the  previous  studies  that  also  find  interdependence  between  resource  abundance  and 
quality of institutions, e.g. Mehlum et al (2006). We discuss this interdependence further 
below;  prior  to  doing  so,  we  investigate  the  robustness  of  the  model  by  considering 
country  specific  estimates.  Doing  so  allows  for  country  specific  slope  coefficients 
whereas in the models of Table 4 the slope coefficients are restricted to be the same 
across all jurisdictions. 
 
Table 5 reports the results for the US states. As before, there is evidence in favour of the 
fixed effect model and, for this model, the goodness of fit is essentially the same as for 
the  fixed  effect  model  in  Table  4.  In  terms  of  the  coefficients,  all  of  the  signs  are 
preserved; there is, however, some substantial variation in coefficient magnitude.  
 
Table 6 reports the regression results for the model estimated with both OLS and fixed 
effects estimator for Canadian provinces only. Again, there is evidence in favour of the 
fixed effect model. Here we find a much weaker set of results. In particular, all variables 
involving  lnMIN  are  statistically  insignificant.  This  means  that  for  the  Canadian 
provinces there is no evidence of a resource curse or indeed a resource effect at all. The 
weak results may be an implication of the relatively few jurisdictions under consideration 
(the ten provinces). Alternatively, it may be the case that the Canadian situation is very 
distinct from the US situation. Consequently, there are two possible conclusions relevant 
for Canada. The first conclusion, if one is happy with the relatively small sample set, is 
that  there  is  no  resource  effect  in  Canada.  The  second  conclusion,  if  one  is  happy 
lumping  Canada  in  with  the  US,  is  that  the  resource  effect  is  as  measured  by  the 
coefficients in Table 4. We leave this decision to the reader, though we will proceed in 
our discussion to consider the results for the full set of regions reported in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Estimation results for all Canadian provinces and US states 
 
Variable  OLS (Unrestricted)  OLS (Restricted)  Fixed Effects 









CDM  -0.352 
(0.013) 
[0.000] 
-  - 










































































Observations  360  360  360 
Adjusted R





-  -  1548.47 
[0.000] 
Values  in  brackets  and  parentheses  indicate  the  standard  errors  and  p-values  of 
estimated coefficients respectively. 
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Table 5: Estimation results for US states only 
 
Variable  OLS (Unrestricted)  Fixed Effects (Unrestricted) 
























































Observations  300  300 
Adjusted R




-  1346.72 
[0.000] 
Values  in  brackets  and  parentheses  indicate  the  standard  errors  and  p-values  of 
estimated coefficients respectively. 
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Table 6: Estimation results for Canadian provinces only 
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-  105.59 
Values  in  brackets  and  parentheses  indicate  the  standard  errors  and  p-values  of 
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We now consider the resource  effects and institutional quality effects implied by the 
coefficient estimates reported in Table 4. To do so, recall that these effects are measured 
as 
 




d(lnRGDPit) =  β3 + 2*β4ln(EFIit)  +   β1(lnMINit) + 2*β2 (lnMINit)(lnEFIit)  
d(lnEFIit) 
 
Table 7 reports these effects measured at the mean levels of lnMIN, lnEFI, lnEFI
2,, and 
lnMINxlnEFI. Clearly, the resource effect (estimated at -0.026 using OLS and -0.013 
using  the  fixed  effects  estimator)  establishes  the  resource  curse  for  all  Canadian 
provinces and US states pooled together. This is not the case when Canadian provinces 
and US states are treated separately. For Canada, where we have already noted that the 
lnMIN coefficients are all statistically insignificant this is what we would expect. (Note 
that the effects reported for Canada only in Table 7 are using the estimated coefficients; 
one could also simply set these to zero.) For the US jurisdictions only, the effect is 
measured as -0.007 but this is statistically insignificant with a p-value of 0.347. So for 
both Canada and the US individually, there is no resource effect. 
 
The results from Table 7 also reveal that the marginal impact of institutional quality at 
the respective means of lnEFIit, lnMINit and lnMINitxlnEFIit is positive for all the models, 
albeit, the effect for the model with Canadian provinces only is statistically insignificant. 
Again, this may reflect that there are only 10 provinces considered for the period under 
review. On balance, there seems to be reasonably strong evidence that at mean levels of 
EFI and MIN, changes in institutional quality are associated with increases in per capita 
output. 
 


















































Values in brackets indicate standard errors of estimated output effects, while values in 
parentheses indicate p-values of Chi-square. 
 
While  Table  7  provides  some  information  about  the  contribution  of  resources  and 
institutional quality they do not give a complete picture since they are focused on mean 
levels of EFI and MIN. Figures 6 and 7 provide a more complete picture by using the   23 
fixed effect coefficient estimates of Table 4 and calculating the various effects across the 
entire sample. 
 
Figure 6 is an empirical counterpart to Figure 1, showing how the resource effect depends 
upon  the  level  of  lnEFI.  The  figure  is  constructed  by  sorting  the  pairs  of  calculated 
resource effects and EFI for all jurisdictions and time periods. In Figure 6, we observe a 
slightly richer relationship than what we hypothesized in Figure 1. First, there are two 
regions of lnEFI that give rise to the resource curse: very low levels and very high levels 
of lnEFI are associated with negative marginal effects. There is a small region, below the 
mean of lnEFI, where the resource effect is positive.  
 
Figure  6  provides  a  much  richer  answer  to  the  question  about  the  interdependence 
between institutional quality and the resource curse than has been given in the previous 
literature. The  non-linear  relationship  clearly  indicates  that  while  improvements  from 





































































Figure 6   24 
Institutional Quality Effect 2005









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Figure 7, the institutional quality effects for the 60 jurisdictions in 2005 are reported. 
These are constructed by substituting each jurisdictions lnMIN and lnEFI values into the 
formula above for the marginal effects of EFI. The results are then sorted from lowest 
effects to highest. What we observe is that for most jurisdictions, the effect of further 
improvements in institutional quality is associated with a rise in output per capita. There 
are, however, some exceptions, where the effect is negative. Generally speaking, these 
are  jurisdictions  with  very  high  levels  of  the EFI  index,  such  as  Texas  and  Alberta. 
Although  it  is  not  a  simple relationship  (it  depends  upon  both  lnMIN  and  lnEFI),  it 
appears that at high levels of EFI there are negative returns. 
 
 
4.6 Fixed Effects Test 
 
The ordinary least squares model can be generalized with a fixed-effects approach using 
the least squares dummy variable technique which allows the model to vary among the 
observations in the sample data in response to jurisdiction-specific fixed effects and, as a 
result, takes into account within-jurisdiction variations. To determine the appropriateness 
of the fixed-effects model, I test for differences across groups by testing the hypothesis 
that the constant terms are all equal with a chi-square test. Under the null hypothesis of 
equality suggested by Greene (2002), the efficient estimator is pooled least squares. The 
fixed effects model allows the unobserved individual effects to be correlated with the 
included variables, the differences between units are then strictly modeled as parametric 
shifts of the regression function.   25 
 
A useful style I adopt here in estimating the fixed effects equation is to completely drop 
the country dummies since they are time-invariant. A cursory look and comparisons of 
the  coefficients  estimated  using both  OLS and  the fixed effects  estimator  yield  some 
interesting insights. First, the results of the former are quite similar to those of the latter 
save for  the significantly large values of  the adjusted  R
2  which suggest  that  the fixed 
effects models have a better goodness of fit compared to the pooled estimator. Many of 
the qualitative conclusions from the model are the same whether a pooled or fixed effects 
estimator is employed. 
 
4.7 Qualifications and Robustness Test 
 
Several  points  in  the  econometric  specification  deserve  special  comment.  First,  the 
problems of country and time differences are addressed by the inclusion of the time and 
country dummies (TDM and CDM) shown in the unrestricted model estimated with OLS 
in Table 4. 
 
Second,  using  the  results  from  Tables  4  -  6,  I  test  to  see  whether  or  not  there  was 
additional unobserved heterogeneity in the data not accounted for in the specified model. 
To  achieve  this  feat,  the  estimates  in  each  table  contain  both  the  restricted  and 
unrestricted versions of  the three models, using OLS and fixed effects estimator. It is 
noteworthy  that  since  the  time-invariant  variable  (CDM)  is  not  included in  the  fixed 
effects model, it is reasonable to conclude that the resulting fixed effects estimated for 
each jurisdiction include the effect of both observed and unobserved heterogeneity across 
jurisdictions.  
 
In line with Greene (2002), the F-test is relied upon to test for the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity. For fixed effects testing, there are three sets of tests. The first set consists 
of two tests that evaluate the joint significance of the cross-section effects using sums-of-
squares  (F-test)  and  the  likelihood  function  (Chi-square  test).  The  corresponding 
restricted specification is one in which there are period effects only. In all cases, the two 
statistic values (F-test and Chi-square test) and the associated p-values strongly reject the 
null that the effects are redundant. In addition, the results evaluate the joint significance 
of the period effects, and of all of the effects, respectively. All of the results suggest that 
the corresponding fixed effects are statistically significant. Given  the null hypothesis 
(H0) which states that unobserved heterogeneity does not exist, the critical values from 
the chi-square tables at the 95% and 99% confidence levels are lower than the reported 
values in Tables 4 - 6 – a confirmation that unobserved heterogeneity does exist and so, 
the fixed effects estimator is a more reliable estimator than the pooled estimator in each 
case.  
 
A closer look at the tables reveals that the use of fixed effects estimator does not alter the 
signs, and for the most part, statistical significance of all the variables. This implies that 
the impact of the asymptotic bias on the pooled estimator is small. Nonetheless, I choose   26 
to  stick  to  the  results  of  the  fixed effects  estimator  for  the  singular reason  that  this 
estimation technique allows the various models to be estimated with a higher degree of 
precision as a result of the goodness-of-fit which is more impressive that what we have 
under OLS. Also, the fact that the fixed effects estimator provides more reliable estimates 
underscores  the  importance  of  using  panel  data  and  panel  estimation  techniques  for 
further research on the resource curse. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The premise for this study is that natural resources may retard economic growth in some 
jurisdictions  and  promote  it  in  others.  This  paper  provides  an  alternative  framework 
which gives new insights to the understanding of the resource curse. It establishes the 
nature  of  the  interaction  between  resource  abundance  and  institutional  quality  as  the 
ultimate determinant of the existence, or otherwise, of the resource curse. Using data for 
Canadian provinces and US states, I show that both resource abundance and institutional 
quality  interact  in  order  to  determine  the  level  of  per  capita  income.  This  helps  in 
establishing that the quality of institutions determines whether or not jurisdictions avoid 
the resource curse. 
 
Among other things, this paper further garners evidence against the findings of Sachs and 
Warner (1995) that the quality of institutions is not important in explaining the resource 
curse. What we find is that there is evidence of interdependence between institutional 
quality  and  the  effect  that  resource  abundance  has  on  output  per  capita.  The 
interdependence is, however, non-linear. Jurisdictions with either low or high levels of 
economic freedom, our measure of institutional quality, experience the resource curse; 
for  jurisdictions  with  mid-range  levels  of  economic  freedom  actually  benefit  from 
marginal increases in resource abundance. 
 
We also show that the direct contribution of economic freedom is also dependent upon 
jurisdictional characteristics. Jurisdictions with very high levels of economic freedom 
have negative returns to further increases in economic freedom; for most jurisdictions, 
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APPENDIX I 
Jurisdictions with below median
3 EFI values in 2005 
 
Jurisdiction  lnRGDP  lnMIN  EFI Score 
Prince Edward Island  9.811  -9.144  3.800 
Quebec  9.997  -4.829  4.300 
Nova Scotia  9.887  -2.838  4.600 
Manitoba  9.961  -3.596  4.700 
New Brunswick  9.933  -4.144  4.800 
West Virgina  10.117  -2.559  5.300 
Newfoundland  10.030  -0.966  5.500 
Saskatchewan  10.150  -1.400  5.500 
British Columbia  10.104  -2.650  5.600 
Ontario  10.194  -4.745  5.700 
Maine  10.297  -8.398  5.800 
Mississippi  10.067  -3.860  5.800 
Montana  10.206  -2.991  6.000 
New Mexico  10.314  -1.965  6.000 
Hawaii  10.522  -7.275  6.100 
Rhode Island  10.472  -7.339  6.200 
Vermont  10.416  -5.042  6.300 
Alaska  10.689  -1.252  6.400 
New York  10.704  -6.940  6.400 
Alabama  10.277  -4.015  6.500 
Maryland  10.552  -6.728  6.500 
North Dakota  10.412  -3.471  6.500 
Washington  10.563  -6.692  6.500 
Arkansas  10.218  -4.534  6.600 
Idaho  10.307  -4.763  6.700 
Kentucky  10.291  -3.813  6.700 
New Jersey  10.688  -7.199  6.700 
Ohio  10.436  -5.326  6.700 
Oklahoma  10.243  -2.049  6.700 
Oregon  10.482  -6.437  6.700 
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APPENDIX II 
Jurisdictions with above median
3 EFI values in 2005 
 
Jurisdiction  lnRGDP  lnMIN  EFI Score 
California  10.621  -5.016  6.800 
Michigan  10.423  -5.844  6.800 
Pennsylvania  10.439  -4.899  6.800 
South Carolina  10.269  -6.191  6.800 
Wisconsin  10.446  -6.337  6.800 
Arizona  10.403  -4.263  7.000 
Connecticut  10.803  -7.418  7.000 
Florida  10.412  -6.488  7.000 
Kansas  10.400  -3.834  7.000 
Missouri  10.391  -5.123  7.000 
Wyoming  10.556  -1.177  7.000 
Illinois  10.561  -5.828  7.100 
Iowa  10.453  -6.101  7.100 
Louisiana  10.355  -2.092  7.200 
Massachusetts  10.714  -7.317  7.200 
Minnesota  10.611  -5.248  7.200 
Virginia  10.617  -5.363  7.200 
Nebraska  10.476  -6.129  7.300 
South Dakota  10.455  -5.262  7.300 
Indiana  10.411  -5.603  7.400 
Tennessee  10.421  -5.897  7.400 
Utah  10.341  -3.559  7.400 
Nevada  10.609  -4.003  7.500 
New Hampshire  10.524  -6.744  7.500 
Colorado  10.608  -3.054  7.600 
Georgia  10.475  -5.578  7.600 
North Carolina  10.485  -6.358  7.600 
Alberta  10.469  -1.100  7.800 
Texas  10.496  -2.370  7.800 
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APPENDIX III 
Jurisdictions and years included in the full sample   
Jurisdiction  Year  CDM TDM lnRGDP  lnMIN  lnEFI  lnMxln
E 
lnEDU  lnHLT 
Alberta  2000  1  1  10.397  -1.255  2.001  -2.512  -3.347  -3.253 
Alberta  2001  1  2  10.397  -1.335  1.988  -2.654  -3.331  -3.199 
Alberta  2002  1  3  10.397  -1.484  1.974  -2.930  -3.230  -3.111 
Alberta  2003  1  4  10.408  -1.279  2.015  -2.577  -3.289  -3.151 
Alberta  2004  1  5  10.442  -1.220  2.028  -2.474  -3.336  -3.192 
Alberta  2005  1  6  10.469  -1.100  2.054  -2.260  -3.443  -3.270 
British Columbia  2000  1  1  9.997  -3.245  1.609  -5.223  -2.976  -2.664 
British Columbia  2001  1  2  9.996  -3.066  1.649  -5.054  -2.938  -2.622 
British Columbia  2002  1  3  10.024  -3.365  1.649  -5.547  -2.928  -2.601 
British Columbia  2003  1  4  10.042  -3.061  1.668  -5.105  -2.960  -2.619 
British Columbia  2004  1  5  10.070  -2.974  1.705  -5.070  -3.000  -2.697 
British Columbia  2005  1  6  10.104  -2.650  1.723  -4.565  -3.049  -2.737 
Manitoba  2000  1  1  9.905  -3.702  1.548  -5.729  -2.943  -2.577 
Manitoba  2001  1  2  9.910  -4.057  1.569  -6.364  -2.962  -2.516 
Manitoba  2002  1  3  9.921  -4.094  1.569  -6.422  -2.941  -2.495 
Manitoba  2003  1  4  9.930  -3.945  1.526  -6.020  -2.891  -2.461 
Manitoba  2004  1  5  9.943  -3.676  1.548  -5.689  -2.912  -2.457 
Manitoba  2005  1  6  9.961  -3.596  1.548  -5.565  -2.902  -2.473 
New Brunswick  2000  1  1  9.799  -4.078  1.569  -6.397  -2.895  -2.631 
New Brunswick  2001  1  2  9.817  -4.107  1.569  -6.442  -2.927  -2.562 
New Brunswick  2002  1  3  9.863  -4.504  1.548  -6.970  -2.908  -2.548 
New Brunswick  2003  1  4  9.890  -4.558  1.569  -7.150  -2.933  -2.555 
New Brunswick  2004  1  5  9.917  -4.211  1.569  -6.606  -2.903  -2.584 
New Brunswick  2005  1  6  9.933  -4.144  1.569  -6.501  -2.842  -2.543 
Newfoundland  2000  1  1  9.777  -1.637  1.459  -2.388  -2.706  -2.458 
Newfoundland  2001  1  2  9.805  -1.760  1.435  -2.526  -2.679  -2.395 
Newfoundland  2002  1  3  9.958  -1.324  1.548  -2.050  -2.788  -2.487 
Newfoundland  2003  1  4  10.019  -1.214  1.589  -1.929  -2.840  -2.512 
Newfoundland  2004  1  5  10.007  -1.138  1.629  -1.853  -2.896  -2.571 
Newfoundland  2005  1  6  10.030  -0.966  1.705  -1.647  -3.026  -2.670 
Nova Scotia  2000  1  1  9.785  -3.124  1.504  -4.699  -2.824  -2.538 
Nova Scotia  2001  1  2  9.817  -3.067  1.526  -4.680  -2.842  -2.486 
Nova Scotia  2002  1  3  9.856  -3.259  1.526  -4.973  -2.842  -2.483 
Nova Scotia  2003  1  4  9.869  -2.960  1.548  -4.580  -2.861  -2.477 
Nova Scotia  2004  1  5  9.874  -3.070  1.526  -4.685  -2.860  -2.472 
Nova Scotia  2005  1  6  9.887  -2.838  1.526  -4.331  -2.784  -2.475 
Ontario  2000  1  1  10.152  -4.827  1.758  -8.486  -3.109  -2.881 
Ontario  2001  1  2  10.153  -4.976  1.740  -8.661  -3.094  -2.846 
Ontario  2002  1  3  10.166  -5.070  1.758  -8.911  -3.097  -2.838 
Ontario  2003  1  4  10.165  -5.014  1.740  -8.727  -3.085  -2.797 
Ontario  2004  1  5  10.178  -4.792  1.758  -8.424  -3.071  -2.776 
Ontario  2005  1  6  10.194  -4.745  1.740  -8.259  -3.040  -2.776 
Prince Edward Island  2000  1  1  9.718  -6.583  1.361  -8.959  -2.743  -2.456 
Prince Edward Island  2001  1  2  9.708  -6.985  1.335  -9.325  -2.728  -2.430 
Prince Edward Island  2002  1  3  9.751  -6.890  1.386  -9.551  -2.731  -2.404 
Prince Edward Island  2003  1  4  9.770  -7.262  1.361  -9.884  -2.697  -2.340   33 
Prince Edward Island  2004  1  5  9.792  -9.395  1.361  -12.786  -2.680  -2.332 
Prince Edward Island  2005  1  6  9.811  -9.144  1.335  -12.207  -2.676  -2.328 
Quebec  2000  1  1  9.935  -4.923  1.482  -7.293  -2.970  -2.658 
Quebec  2001  1  2  9.945  -5.151  1.459  -7.513  -2.960  -2.624 
Quebec  2002  1  3  9.962  -5.202  1.482  -7.707  -2.944  -2.623 
Quebec  2003  1  4  9.969  -5.107  1.435  -7.329  -2.940  -2.594 
Quebec  2004  1  5  9.989  -5.000  1.459  -7.292  -2.958  -2.593 
Quebec  2005  1  6  9.997  -4.829  1.459  -7.044  -2.970  -2.584 
Saskatchewan  2000  1  1  10.022  -1.626  1.649  -2.681  -3.026  -2.816 
Saskatchewan  2001  1  2  10.020  -1.797  1.609  -2.892  -2.952  -2.726 
Saskatchewan  2002  1  3  10.021  -1.760  1.609  -2.833  -2.937  -2.738 
Saskatchewan  2003  1  4  10.068  -1.679  1.609  -2.703  -2.952  -2.756 
Saskatchewan  2004  1  5  10.117  -1.572  1.668  -2.621  -3.014  -2.781 
Saskatchewan  2005  1  6  10.150  -1.400  1.705  -2.387  -3.049  -2.813 
Alabama  2000  0  1  10.156  -4.336  1.825  -7.912  -5.430  -2.729 
Alabama  2001  0  2  10.162  -4.290  1.825  -7.828  -5.404  -2.697 
Alabama  2002  0  3  10.183  -4.413  1.825  -8.051  -5.362  -2.647 
Alabama  2003  0  4  10.207  -4.223  1.856  -7.839  -5.350  -2.656 
Alabama  2004  0  5  10.253  -4.176  1.872  -7.816  -5.315  -2.666 
Alabama  2005  0  6  10.277  -4.015  1.872  -7.514  -5.351  -2.665 
Alaska  2000  0  1  10.671  -1.552  1.825  -2.832  -5.683  -3.048 
Alaska  2001  0  2  10.614  -1.806  1.808  -3.265  -5.700  -2.908 
Alaska  2002  0  3  10.683  -1.749  1.808  -3.163  -5.637  -2.899 
Alaska  2003  0  4  10.649  -1.614  1.825  -2.945  -5.676  -2.844 
Alaska  2004  0  5  10.687  -1.440  1.856  -2.673  -5.748  -2.853 
Alaska  2005  0  6  10.689  -1.252  1.856  -2.325  -5.852  -2.928 
Arizona  2000  0  1  10.331  -4.661  1.946  -9.070  -5.404  -2.859 
Arizona  2001  0  2  10.336  -4.865  1.946  -9.467  -5.304  -2.803 
Arizona  2002  0  3  10.329  -4.954  1.946  -9.640  -5.125  -2.749 
Arizona  2003  0  4  10.348  -4.933  1.960  -9.668  -5.053  -2.702 
Arizona  2004  0  5  10.354  -4.716  1.946  -9.176  -4.907  -2.673 
Arizona  2005  0  6  10.403  -4.263  1.946  -8.296  -4.911  -2.695 
Arkansas  2000  0  1  10.124  -5.111  1.856  -9.487  -5.633  -2.676 
Arkansas  2001  0  2  10.123  -4.924  1.841  -9.063  -5.572  -2.618 
Arkansas  2002  0  3  10.146  -4.987  1.825  -9.099  -5.507  -2.599 
Arkansas  2003  0  4  10.167  -4.829  1.856  -8.964  -5.479  -2.582 
Arkansas  2004  0  5  10.206  -4.759  1.872  -8.909  -5.499  -2.591 
Arkansas  2005  0  6  10.218  -4.534  1.887  -8.556  -5.494  -2.579 
California  2000  0  1  10.542  -5.125  1.872  -9.594  -5.034  -3.003 
California  2001  0  2  10.523  -5.296  1.872  -9.913  -4.971  -2.909 
California  2002  0  3  10.524  -5.431  1.887  -10.248  -4.873  -2.840 
California  2003  0  4  10.542  -5.303  1.902  -10.087  -4.837  -2.815 
California  2004  0  5  10.584  -5.188  1.917  -9.945  -4.830  -2.820 
California  2005  0  6  10.621  -5.016  1.917  -9.615  -4.846  -2.841 
Colorado  2000  0  1  10.589  -4.162  2.001  -8.331  -5.248  -3.015 
Colorado  2001  0  2  10.582  -4.125  2.001  -8.257  -5.213  -2.937 
Colorado  2002  0  3  10.571  -4.093  2.015  -8.247  -5.179  -2.870 
Colorado  2003  0  4  10.566  -3.586  2.028  -7.273  -5.129  -2.845 
Colorado  2004  0  5  10.578  -3.410  2.028  -6.917  -5.079  -2.839 
Colorado  2005  0  6  10.608  -3.054  2.028  -6.194  -5.072  -2.873 
Connecticut  2000  0  1  10.758  -7.781  1.932  -15.029  -4.354  -2.684 
Connecticut  2001  0  2  10.758  -7.619  1.932  -14.717  -4.332  -2.644   34 
Connecticut  2002  0  3  10.736  -7.498  1.917  -14.374  -4.241  -2.595 
Connecticut  2003  0  4  10.736  -7.458  1.932  -14.405  -4.183  -2.565 
Connecticut  2004  0  5  10.773  -7.538  1.946  -14.668  -4.190  -2.583 
Connecticut  2005  0  6  10.803  -7.418  1.946  -14.435  -4.217  -2.596 
Delaware  2000  0  1  10.873  -8.687  2.092  -18.172  -5.474  -3.042 
Delaware  2001  0  2  10.898  -8.617  2.104  -18.132  -5.455  -3.025 
Delaware  2002  0  3  10.886  -8.642  2.116  -18.289  -5.379  -2.980 
Delaware  2003  0  4  10.917  -8.712  2.128  -18.540  -5.371  -2.965 
Delaware  2004  0  5  10.942  -8.380  2.128  -17.834  -5.343  -2.959 
Delaware  2005  0  6  10.984  -8.318  2.140  -17.800  -5.369  -2.976 
Florida  2000  0  1  10.288  -6.582  1.872  -12.320  -5.076  -2.660 
Florida  2001  0  2  10.298  -6.671  1.887  -12.590  -5.046  -2.617 
Florida  2002  0  3  10.304  -6.687  1.917  -12.818  -4.998  -2.602 
Florida  2003  0  4  10.333  -6.699  1.932  -12.939  -4.975  -2.585 
Florida  2004  0  5  10.364  -6.666  1.932  -12.876  -4.949  -2.603 
Florida  2005  0  6  10.412  -6.488  1.946  -12.625  -4.976  -2.649 
Georgia  2000  0  1  10.473  -5.622  2.001  -11.253  -5.194  -3.003 
Georgia  2001  0  2  10.457  -5.684  2.001  -11.377  -4.869  -2.946 
Georgia  2002  0  3  10.442  -5.705  2.001  -11.418  -4.845  -2.896 
Georgia  2003  0  4  10.443  -5.668  2.015  -11.421  -4.838  -2.854 
Georgia  2004  0  5  10.459  -5.637  2.028  -11.433  -4.823  -2.846 
Georgia  2005  0  6  10.475  -5.578  2.028  -11.313  -4.834  -2.846 
Hawaii  2000  0  1  10.410  -7.269  1.758  -12.779  -4.603  -2.718 
Hawaii  2001  0  2  10.415  -7.207  1.775  -12.792  -4.608  -2.696 
Hawaii  2002  0  3  10.419  -7.214  1.775  -12.805  -4.591  -2.689 
Hawaii  2003  0  4  10.445  -7.191  1.792  -12.884  -4.547  -2.680 
Hawaii  2004  0  5  10.482  -7.273  1.808  -13.151  -4.553  -2.703 
Hawaii  2005  0  6  10.522  -7.275  1.808  -13.155  -4.579  -2.727 
Idaho  2000  0  1  10.201  -5.472  1.856  -10.158  -5.381  -2.822 
Idaho  2001  0  2  10.191  -5.645  1.841  -10.389  -5.294  -2.735 
Idaho  2002  0  3  10.189  -5.730  1.841  -10.546  -5.172  -2.686 
Idaho  2003  0  4  10.195  -5.713  1.872  -10.694  -5.090  -2.660 
Idaho  2004  0  5  10.257  -5.591  1.887  -10.551  -5.119  -2.689 
Idaho  2005  0  6  10.307  -4.763  1.902  -9.060  -5.153  -2.721 
Illinois  2000  0  1  10.527  -6.000  1.932  -11.588  -4.749  -2.853 
Illinois  2001  0  2  10.523  -5.944  1.932  -11.481  -4.708  -2.799 
Illinois  2002  0  3  10.521  -5.971  1.946  -11.619  -4.661  -2.764 
Illinois  2003  0  4  10.545  -5.993  1.960  -11.747  -4.626  -2.750 
Illinois  2004  0  5  10.558  -5.963  1.974  -11.772  -4.598  -2.738 
Illinois  2005  0  6  10.561  -5.828  1.960  -11.423  -4.579  -2.723 
Indiana  2000  0  1  10.371  -5.698  1.960  -11.168  -5.094  -2.761 
Indiana  2001  0  2  10.344  -5.498  1.946  -10.699  -4.986  -2.680 
Indiana  2002  0  3  10.374  -5.538  1.946  -10.776  -4.945  -2.661 
Indiana  2003  0  4  10.402  -5.592  1.988  -11.116  -4.957  -2.649 
Indiana  2004  0  5  10.426  -5.637  2.001  -11.282  -4.935  -2.644 
Indiana  2005  0  6  10.411  -5.603  2.001  -11.215  -4.874  -2.618 
Iowa  2000  0  1  10.335  -6.211  1.887  -11.721  -4.821  -2.740 
Iowa  2001  0  2  10.326  -6.293  1.902  -11.970  -4.798  -2.680 
Iowa  2002  0  3  10.364  -6.321  1.902  -12.024  -4.788  -2.683 
Iowa  2003  0  4  10.388  -6.347  1.932  -12.260  -4.792  -2.674 
Iowa  2004  0  5  10.442  -6.327  1.960  -12.402  -4.795  -2.704 
Iowa  2005  0  6  10.453  -6.101  1.960  -11.959  -4.791  -2.688   35 
Kansas  2000  0  1  10.334  -4.352  1.902  -8.277  -5.254  -2.742 
Kansas  2001  0  2  10.344  -4.385  1.887  -8.275  -5.267  -2.700 
Kansas  2002  0  3  10.356  -4.468  1.887  -8.432  -5.248  -2.670 
Kansas  2003  0  4  10.369  -4.184  1.917  -8.021  -5.244  -2.655 
Kansas  2004  0  5  10.384  -4.060  1.932  -7.843  -5.299  -2.637 
Kansas  2005  0  6  10.400  -3.834  1.946  -7.460  -5.315  -2.646 
Kentucky  2000  0  1  10.227  -3.904  1.841  -7.185  -5.315  -2.655 
Kentucky  2001  0  2  10.225  -3.851  1.856  -7.149  -5.263  -2.589 
Kentucky  2002  0  3  10.249  -3.867  1.872  -7.238  -5.251  -2.558 
Kentucky  2003  0  4  10.258  -3.927  1.872  -7.351  -5.229  -2.519 
Kentucky  2004  0  5  10.275  -3.904  1.887  -7.368  -5.204  -2.515 
Kentucky  2005  0  6  10.291  -3.813  1.902  -7.253  -5.181  -2.518 
Louisiana  2000  0  1  10.290  -1.928  1.932  -3.724  -4.969  -2.780 
Louisiana  2001  0  2  10.274  -2.015  1.902  -3.832  -4.913  -2.737 
Louisiana  2002  0  3  10.277  -2.473  1.872  -4.629  -4.820  -2.682 
Louisiana  2003  0  4  10.291  -2.244  1.932  -4.334  -4.906  -2.701 
Louisiana  2004  0  5  10.343  -2.170  1.946  -4.222  -4.953  -2.741 
Louisiana  2005  0  6  10.355  -2.092  1.974  -4.130  -5.100  -2.845 
Maine  2000  0  1  10.234  -8.869  1.705  -15.119  -4.716  -2.370 
Maine  2001  0  2  10.246  -8.730  1.740  -15.195  -4.690  -2.318 
Maine  2002  0  3  10.254  -8.770  1.740  -15.264  -4.635  -2.286 
Maine  2003  0  4  10.263  -8.655  1.740  -15.063  -4.592  -2.258 
Maine  2004  0  5  10.301  -8.594  1.758  -15.107  -4.610  -2.251 
Maine  2005  0  6  10.297  -8.398  1.758  -14.762  -4.620  -2.238 
Maryland  2000  0  1  10.433  -7.133  1.841  -13.129  -4.512  -2.676 
Maryland  2001  0  2  10.460  -7.075  1.841  -13.022  -4.505  -2.646 
Maryland  2002  0  3  10.479  -6.979  1.856  -12.956  -4.436  -2.629 
Maryland  2003  0  4  10.492  -6.947  1.872  -13.004  -4.392  -2.605 
Maryland  2004  0  5  10.522  -6.870  1.887  -12.964  -4.369  -2.611 
Maryland  2005  0  6  10.552  -6.728  1.872  -12.593  -4.389  -2.631 
Massachusetts  2000  0  1  10.674  -7.704  1.917  -14.768  -3.839  -2.603 
Massachusetts  2001  0  2  10.673  -7.540  1.932  -14.564  -3.797  -2.562 
Massachusetts  2002  0  3  10.663  -7.508  1.946  -14.610  -3.723  -2.505 
Massachusetts  2003  0  4  10.683  -7.491  1.960  -14.683  -3.716  -2.462 
Massachusetts  2004  0  5  10.704  -7.366  1.974  -14.541  -3.691  -2.449 
Massachusetts  2005  0  6  10.714  -7.317  1.974  -14.444  -3.698  -2.429 
Michigan  2000  0  1  10.430  -6.192  1.902  -11.778  -5.384  -2.785 
Michigan  2001  0  2  10.394  -6.169  1.887  -11.641  -5.326  -2.713 
Michigan  2002  0  3  10.421  -6.287  1.887  -11.863  -5.279  -2.691 
Michigan  2003  0  4  10.431  -6.189  1.887  -11.678  -5.188  -2.655 
Michigan  2004  0  5  10.419  -6.076  1.902  -11.557  -5.101  -2.617 
Michigan  2005  0  6  10.423  -5.844  1.917  -11.203  -5.060  -2.588 
Minnesota  2000  0  1  10.532  -5.551  1.917  -10.640  -4.900  -2.678 
Minnesota  2001  0  2  10.529  -5.784  1.917  -11.088  -4.898  -2.613 
Minnesota  2002  0  3  10.548  -5.737  1.932  -11.082  -4.852  -2.564 
Minnesota  2003  0  4  10.571  -5.791  1.946  -11.269  -4.830  -2.529 
Minnesota  2004  0  5  10.606  -5.606  1.960  -10.989  -4.835  -2.540 
Minnesota  2005  0  6  10.611  -5.248  1.974  -10.360  -4.828  -2.536 
Mississippi  2000  0  1  10.024  -4.401  1.723  -7.582  -5.281  -2.749 
Mississippi  2001  0  2  10.018  -4.250  1.723  -7.322  -5.253  -2.697 
Mississippi  2002  0  3  10.025  -4.286  1.705  -7.306  -5.229  -2.658 
Mississippi  2003  0  4  10.053  -4.002  1.758  -7.035  -5.237  -2.650   36 
Mississippi  2004  0  5  10.067  -3.821  1.775  -6.783  -5.231  -2.639 
Mississippi  2005  0  6  10.067  -3.860  1.758  -6.785  -5.212  -2.651 
Missouri  2000  0  1  10.358  -5.973  1.917  -11.450  -4.542  -2.690 
Missouri  2001  0  2  10.358  -6.007  1.902  -11.425  -4.521  -2.651 
Missouri  2002  0  3  10.364  -6.002  1.902  -11.416  -4.473  -2.621 
Missouri  2003  0  4  10.377  -5.909  1.932  -11.413  -4.472  -2.600 
Missouri  2004  0  5  10.388  -5.647  1.946  -10.988  -4.438  -2.589 
Missouri  2005  0  6  10.391  -5.123  1.946  -9.969  -4.419  -2.586 
Montana  2000  0  1  10.071  -3.390  1.668  -5.654  -5.551  -2.441 
Montana  2001  0  2  10.083  -3.403  1.668  -5.675  -5.554  -2.419 
Montana  2002  0  3  10.104  -3.526  1.686  -5.947  -5.503  -2.379 
Montana  2003  0  4  10.144  -3.460  1.723  -5.961  -5.552  -2.398 
Montana  2004  0  5  10.163  -3.294  1.775  -5.846  -5.511  -2.393 
Montana  2005  0  6  10.206  -2.991  1.792  -5.358  -5.572  -2.422 
Nebraska  2000  0  1  10.385  -6.704  1.917  -12.851  -4.912  -2.716 
Nebraska  2001  0  2  10.389  -6.540  1.917  -12.536  -4.836  -2.673 
Nebraska  2002  0  3  10.405  -6.366  1.917  -12.204  -4.825  -2.649 
Nebraska  2003  0  4  10.450  -6.394  1.960  -12.533  -4.860  -2.642 
Nebraska  2004  0  5  10.463  -6.415  1.974  -12.663  -4.831  -2.633 
Nebraska  2005  0  6  10.476  -6.129  1.988  -12.184  -4.843  -2.621 
Nevada  2000  0  1  10.506  -3.959  1.946  -7.703  -6.340  -3.094 
Nevada  2001  0  2  10.488  -4.088  1.946  -7.955  -6.258  -3.019 
Nevada  2002  0  3  10.480  -4.134  1.974  -8.161  -6.129  -2.984 
Nevada  2003  0  4  10.506  -4.133  1.988  -8.215  -6.115  -2.971 
Nevada  2004  0  5  10.563  -4.153  2.015  -8.368  -6.043  -3.008 
Nevada  2005  0  6  10.609  -4.003  2.015  -8.066  -5.974  -3.051 
New Hampshire  2000  0  1  10.466  -7.545  1.960  -14.790  -4.245  -2.659 
New Hampshire  2001  0  2  10.454  -7.440  1.974  -14.687  -4.192  -2.577 
New Hampshire  2002  0  3  10.465  -4.134  2.001  -8.274  -6.129  -2.984 
New Hampshire  2003  0  4  10.486  -7.228  2.015  -14.563  -4.041  -2.497 
New Hampshire  2004  0  5  10.517  -7.110  2.015  -14.327  -4.028  -2.499 
New Hampshire  2005  0  6  10.524  -6.744  2.015  -13.588  -4.038  -2.485 
New Jersey  2000  0  1  10.619  -7.394  1.872  -13.840  -4.788  -2.794 
New Jersey  2001  0  2  10.641  -7.386  1.887  -13.938  -4.768  -2.748 
New Jersey  2002  0  3  10.642  -7.636  1.902  -14.524  -4.703  -2.696 
New Jersey  2003  0  4  10.662  -7.588  1.902  -14.434  -4.664  -2.674 
New Jersey  2004  0  5  10.683  -7.415  1.902  -14.104  -4.775  -2.661 
New Jersey  2005  0  6  10.688  -7.199  1.902  -13.693  -4.795  -2.647 
New Mexico  2000  0  1  10.235  -2.522  1.808  -4.560  -5.436  -2.897 
New Mexico  2001  0  2  10.235  -2.488  1.758  -4.373  -5.349  -2.811 
New Mexico  2002  0  3  10.237  -2.586  1.705  -4.408  -5.316  -2.719 
New Mexico  2003  0  4  10.266  -2.270  1.740  -3.951  -5.314  -2.720 
New Mexico  2004  0  5  10.313  -2.204  1.792  -3.950  -5.250  -2.738 
New Mexico  2005  0  6  10.314  -1.965  1.792  -3.520  -5.263  -2.755 
New York  2000  0  1  10.619  -7.488  1.841  -13.782  -4.321  -2.670 
New York  2001  0  2  10.636  -7.398  1.841  -13.617  -4.301  -2.645 
New York  2002  0  3  10.629  -7.373  1.841  -13.570  -4.235  -2.592 
New York  2003  0  4  10.646  -7.266  1.856  -13.489  -4.195  -2.560 
New York  2004  0  5  10.669  -7.197  1.856  -13.361  -4.174  -2.572 
New York  2005  0  6  10.704  -6.940  1.856  -12.883  -4.178  -2.598 
North Carolina  2000  0  1  10.431  -6.243  2.001  -12.496  -5.057  -2.946 
North Carolina  2001  0  2  10.432  -6.286  2.001  -12.581  -5.020  -2.877   37 
North Carolina  2002  0  3  10.433  -6.576  2.001  -13.162  -4.946  -2.839 
North Carolina  2003  0  4  10.436  -6.570  2.015  -13.238  -4.898  -2.781 
North Carolina  2004  0  5  10.454  -6.446  2.015  -12.987  -4.848  -2.780 
North Carolina  2005  0  6  10.485  -6.358  2.028  -12.895  -4.854  -2.794 
North Dakota  2000  0  1  10.229  -3.826  1.740  -6.659  -5.440  -2.414 
North Dakota  2001  0  2  10.245  -3.806  1.758  -6.690  -5.470  -2.387 
North Dakota  2002  0  3  10.299  -3.919  1.775  -6.955  -5.432  -2.404 
North Dakota  2003  0  4  10.354  -3.823  1.825  -6.974  -5.495  -2.424 
North Dakota  2004  0  5  10.354  -3.697  1.856  -6.862  -5.467  -2.403 
North Dakota  2005  0  6  10.412  -3.471  1.872  -6.498  -5.635  -2.443 
Ohio  2000  0  1  10.396  -5.523  1.887  -10.422  -5.013  -2.673 
Ohio  2001  0  2  10.377  -5.622  1.872  -10.524  -4.985  -2.599 
Ohio  2002  0  3  10.396  -5.633  1.872  -10.543  -4.963  -2.579 
Ohio  2003  0  4  10.408  -5.540  1.887  -10.454  -4.930  -2.549 
Ohio  2004  0  5  10.430  -5.456  1.902  -10.379  -4.905  -2.540 
Ohio  2005  0  6  10.436  -5.326  1.902  -10.131  -4.886  -2.536 
Oklahoma  2000  0  1  10.165  -2.762  1.841  -5.084  -5.348  -2.760 
Oklahoma  2001  0  2  10.185  -2.705  1.825  -4.936  -5.313  -2.720 
Oklahoma  2002  0  3  10.192  -2.780  1.808  -5.027  -5.266  -2.677 
Oklahoma  2003  0  4  10.203  -2.424  1.856  -4.500  -5.287  -2.673 
Oklahoma  2004  0  5  10.230  -2.263  1.887  -4.271  -5.285  -2.675 
Oklahoma  2005  0  6  10.243  -2.049  1.902  -3.898  -5.311  -2.706 
Oregon  2000  0  1  10.397  -6.710  1.856  -12.456  -5.120  -2.758 
Oregon  2001  0  2  10.369  -6.697  1.872  -12.535  -5.083  -2.644 
Oregon  2002  0  3  10.395  -6.674  1.872  -12.492  -5.054  -2.617 
Oregon  2003  0  4  10.410  -6.685  1.887  -12.615  -5.041  -2.574 
Oregon  2004  0  5  10.469  -6.644  1.902  -12.637  -4.985  -2.587 
Oregon  2005  0  6  10.482  -6.437  1.902  -12.244  -4.967  -2.576 
Pennsylvania  2000  0  1  10.365  -5.133  1.856  -9.528  -4.069  -2.501 
Pennsylvania  2001  0  2  10.380  -5.173  1.872  -9.683  -4.053  -2.461 
Pennsylvania  2002  0  3  10.397  -5.206  1.887  -9.824  -4.007  -2.428 
Pennsylvania  2003  0  4  10.417  -5.173  1.902  -9.839  -3.988  -2.402 
Pennsylvania  2004  0  5  10.426  -5.043  1.902  -9.593  -3.964  -2.370 
Pennsylvania  2005  0  6  10.439  -4.899  1.917  -9.391  -3.959  -2.377 
Rhode Island  2000  0  1  10.373  -7.858  1.758  -13.813  -3.899  -2.467 
Rhode Island  2001  0  2  10.383  -7.695  1.758  -13.526  -3.894  -2.441 
Rhode Island  2002  0  3  10.397  -7.572  1.758  -13.310  -3.858  -2.386 
Rhode Island  2003  0  4  10.436  -7.585  1.808  -13.715  -3.865  -2.387 
Rhode Island  2004  0  5  10.472  -7.280  1.808  -13.164  -3.849  -2.397 
Rhode Island  2005  0  6  10.472  -7.339  1.825  -13.390  -3.811  -2.378 
South Carolina  2000  0  1  10.239  -6.328  1.902  -12.036  -5.381  -2.997 
South Carolina  2001  0  2  10.243  -6.479  1.887  -12.227  -5.350  -2.916 
South Carolina  2002  0  3  10.247  -6.472  1.887  -12.213  -5.295  -2.893 
South Carolina  2003  0  4  10.271  -6.421  1.902  -12.214  -5.285  -2.885 
South Carolina  2004  0  5  10.260  -6.260  1.902  -11.907  -5.243  -2.861 
South Carolina  2005  0  6  10.269  -6.191  1.917  -11.867  -5.246  -2.847 
South Dakota  2000  0  1  10.328  -5.347  1.917  -10.250  -5.030  -2.543 
South Dakota  2001  0  2  10.335  -5.286  1.932  -10.211  -5.026  -2.505 
South Dakota  2002  0  3  10.411  -5.463  1.960  -10.708  -5.006  -2.498 
South Dakota  2003  0  4  10.420  -5.448  1.988  -10.830  -4.977  -2.454 
South Dakota  2004  0  5  10.444  -5.433  1.988  -10.800  -5.030  -2.453 
South Dakota  2005  0  6  10.455  -5.262  1.988  -10.460  -5.016  -2.455   38 
Tennessee  2000  0  1  10.331  -5.923  1.960  -11.610  -4.862  -2.604 
Tennessee  2001  0  2  10.330  -5.968  1.960  -11.699  -4.814  -2.545 
Tennessee  2002  0  3  10.360  -6.032  1.960  -11.822  -4.754  -2.510 
Tennessee  2003  0  4  10.381  -6.116  1.988  -12.158  -4.684  -2.488 
Tennessee  2004  0  5  10.416  -6.061  1.988  -12.049  -4.639  -2.466 
Tennessee  2005  0  6  10.421  -5.897  2.001  -11.803  -4.592  -2.454 
Texas  2000  0  1  10.455  -2.779  2.001  -5.561  -5.304  -2.932 
Texas  2001  0  2  10.461  -2.850  2.001  -5.705  -5.270  -2.878 
Texas  2002  0  3  10.464  -2.995  2.015  -6.034  -5.205  -2.812 
Texas  2003  0  4  10.462  -2.661  2.028  -5.397  -5.204  -2.804 
Texas  2004  0  5  10.490  -2.581  2.041  -5.269  -5.199  -2.807 
Texas  2005  0  6  10.496  -2.370  2.054  -4.868  -5.243  -2.853 
Utah  2000  0  1  10.313  -4.206  1.960  -8.244  -4.636  -2.990 
Utah  2001  0  2  10.302  -4.164  1.974  -8.220  -4.604  -2.947 
Utah  2002  0  3  10.295  -4.338  1.974  -8.564  -4.568  -2.906 
Utah  2003  0  4  10.291  -4.098  1.988  -8.147  -4.573  -2.875 
Utah  2004  0  5  10.306  -3.964  2.001  -7.934  -4.545  -2.879 
Utah  2005  0  6  10.341  -3.559  2.001  -7.124  -4.538  -2.903 
Vermont  2000  0  1  10.280  -5.743  1.792  -10.290  -3.934  -2.528 
Vermont  2001  0  2  10.319  -5.461  1.792  -9.785  -3.957  -2.465 
Vermont  2002  0  3  10.334  -5.286  1.808  -9.558  -3.905  -2.410 
Vermont  2003  0  4  10.367  -5.259  1.841  -9.679  -3.908  -2.385 
Vermont  2004  0  5  10.398  -5.376  1.841  -9.895  -3.869  -2.383 
Vermont  2005  0  6  10.416  -5.042  1.841  -9.279  -3.869  -2.365 
Virginia  2000  0  1  10.511  -5.583  1.932  -10.783  -5.061  -3.047 
Virginia  2001  0  2  10.532  -5.534  1.946  -10.769  -5.043  -3.002 
Virginia  2002  0  3  10.526  -5.602  1.946  -10.900  -5.002  -2.950 
Virginia  2003  0  4  10.551  -5.486  1.960  -10.753  -4.961  -2.931 
Virginia  2004  0  5  10.583  -5.267  1.974  -10.398  -4.926  -2.948 
Virginia  2005  0  6  10.617  -5.363  1.974  -10.588  -4.952  -2.962 
Washington  2000  0  1  10.533  -6.637  1.825  -12.109  -5.295  -2.859 
Washington  2001  0  2  10.513  -6.814  1.841  -12.541  -5.265  -2.778 
Washington  2002  0  3  10.505  -6.823  1.856  -12.665  -5.226  -2.732 
Washington  2003  0  4  10.514  -6.847  1.872  -12.815  -5.222  -2.706 
Washington  2004  0  5  10.525  -6.937  1.872  -12.984  -5.170  -2.692 
Washington  2005  0  6  10.563  -6.692  1.872  -12.526  -5.221  -2.719 
West Virgina  2000  0  1  10.041  -2.680  1.589  -4.260  -5.272  -2.394 
West Virgina  2001  0  2  10.057  -2.609  1.589  -4.146  -5.266  -2.385 
West Virgina  2002  0  3  10.069  -2.730  1.589  -4.338  -5.303  -2.362 
West Virgina  2003  0  4  10.071  -2.726  1.649  -4.495  -5.376  -2.336 
West Virgina  2004  0  5  10.098  -2.650  1.649  -4.368  -5.398  -2.349 
West Virgina  2005  0  6  10.117  -2.559  1.668  -4.268  -5.445  -2.379 
Wisconsin  2000  0  1  10.395  -6.528  1.887  -12.318  -4.983  -2.653 
Wisconsin  2001  0  2  10.398  -6.558  1.887  -12.376  -4.948  -2.590 
Wisconsin  2002  0  3  10.408  -6.575  1.887  -12.408  -4.905  -2.547 
Wisconsin  2003  0  4  10.423  -6.533  1.917  -12.523  -4.877  -2.512 
Wisconsin  2004  0  5  10.438  -6.400  1.917  -12.269  -4.840  -2.491 
Wisconsin  2005  0  6  10.446  -6.337  1.917  -12.147  -4.858  -2.495 
Wyoming  2000  0  1  10.466  -1.546  1.841  -2.846  -6.359  -3.154 
Wyoming  2001  0  2  10.512  -1.534  1.872  -2.872  -6.238  -3.141 
Wyoming  2002  0  3  10.519  -1.537  1.902  -2.923  -6.013  -3.096 
Wyoming  2003  0  4  10.539  -1.378  1.917  -2.642  -6.134  -3.120   39 
Wyoming  2004  0  5  10.542  -1.304  1.946  -2.537  -6.110  -3.119 
Wyoming  2005  0  6  10.556  -1.177  1.946  -2.291  -6.181  -3.190 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 